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 S E C R E T/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS CITE
 SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR: COM FROM STATE INR

US REP UN - EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK

APPROPRIATE POSTS PLEASE PASS TO AMB. HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

SUBJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF ARAB-ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS - 03/08/83

ARAB-ISRAELI HIGHLIGHTS

US-OMANI ACCORD ON ACCESS AGREEMENTS (ENTIRE TEXT: S/NF/NC/OC/
 EXDIS)

THE US-OMANI TALKS OF FEBRUARY 26 AND 27 IN MUSCAT SETTLED DIFFERENCES OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON AMERICAN ACCESS TO OMANI MILITARY FACILITIES AND CONFIRMED OMAN'S COMMITMENT TO CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. THE TALKS ALSO ESTABLISHED THE PREEMINENCE OF MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS YUSUF AL-ALAWI IN MANAGING OMAN'S SECURITY TIES WITH THE US. OMAN, NEVERTHELESS, REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL LIABILITIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT IT BE COMPENSATED FOR THEM.

ON BALANCE, THE TALKS REPRESENTED A MAJOR ADVANCE IN US-OMANI RELATIONS, PAVING THE WAY FOR THE SULTAN'S APRIL VISIT TO WASHINGTON. TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULTS, THE OMANI LEADERSHIP DISREGARDED CRITICISM OMANI NATIONALISTS' SENSITIVITY TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREPOSITIONING US EQUIPMENT; THE RECALCITRANCE OF THE SECONDED BRITISH MILITARY LEADERSHIP; SOVIET DENUNCIATIONS; AND UNCERTAINTY OVER FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. ANY LURKING SUSPICION THAT OMAN MAY HAVE BEEN POSITIONING ITSELF TO FUNDAMENTALLY RECONSIDER ITS SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE US HAS BEEN LAID TO REST FOR THE TIME BEING.

THE TALKS WERE ALSO SIGNIFICANT IN DEMONSTRATING THAT REASONABLY CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN OMAN FOR MANAGING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. AL-ALAWI IS IN OVERALL CONTROL OF THAT RELATIONSHIP AND HAS ALSO BEEN CONFIRMED AS ARCHITECT AND SPOKESMAN OF OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE THE COMMANDER OF THE DEFENSE STAFF, THE SECONDED BRITISH GENERAL CREASEY, REMAINS THE KEY MILITARY DECISION-MAKER AND RETAINS THE SULTAN'S FULL CONFIDENCE, AL-ALAWI WILL INCURE THAT ALL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ARE CONSIDERED IN MAKING FINAL POLICY DECISIONS.

THE OMANIS ARE REPORTED TO BELIEVE THAT THE US FOR THE FIRST TIME UNDERSTANDS THAT, EACH ELEMENT OF THE ACCESS AGREEMENT HAS

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POLITICAL LIABILITIES WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE OMANIS REPORTEDLY VIEW THIS AS THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE TALKS. AL-ALAWI AND ALI MAJID AL-MA'AMARI, PRESIDENT OF THE PALACE OFFICE, REPRESENTING A STRONGLY NATIONALIST POSITION, WILL INSIST THAT JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES WHOSE TIMING AND PUBLICITY HAVE CAUSED PAST EMBARRASSMENT, NOT COMPROMISE OMAN POLITICALLY IN THE FUTURE. DESPITE A DISCLAIMER BY AL-ALAWI THAT OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS ARE A POLITICAL ISSUE,, THE OMANIS WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RISKS THEY INCUR. THE DECLINE IN THEIR MODEST OIL REVENUES CAN BE EXPECTED TO REINFORCE THEIR DEMANDS.

WHILE THE DANGER FROM THE PDRY APPEARS TO HAVE LESSENED, OMAN'S FEAR OF IRAN REMAINS INTENSE AND ITS CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SOVIET-SPONSORED THREATS IS STILL KEEN. GROWING OMANI NATIONALISM DOES NOT THREATEN THE US-OMANI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, AND THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT OTHER GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL MEMBERS INCREASINGLY ACCEPT OMAN'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

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APPROPRIATE POSTS PLEASE PASS TO AMB. HABIB AND DAS DRAPER

SUBJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF ARAB-ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS - 03/08/83
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

EGYPT-JORDAN: PRESIDENT MUBARAK MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AT THE NAM CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI ON MARCH 7. OSAMA AL-BAZ INDICATED THAT THE TWO LEADERS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, LEBANON, AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AL-BAZ SAID THAT "IT ALL NOW DEPENDS ON THE REPLY WHICH (ARAFAT) WILL COMMUNICATE TO KING HUSSEIN...AND IT DEPENDS ON THE JORDANIAN DECISION.... EACH PARTY SHOULD SHOULD ITS DUTY OF OTHER PARTIES." ON EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARD THE PEACE PROCESS, AL-BAZ SAID THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT BEFORE A SPECIFIC "AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON ISRAEL'S TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.... WE EXPECT THE US TO PLAY A DEFINITE ROLE TO LIMIT ISRAEL'S ACTION AND TO ASK IT TO ADAPT STEPS THAT WILL MAKE IT EASY TO START WITH PEACE STEPS." HE SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS ON ALL LEVELS. (U)

LEBANON-ISRAEL-US-NEGOTIATIONS: AMBASSADOR DRAPER REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS EMPHATIC ON MARCH 4 IN HIS REJECTION OF ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL THAT HADDAD BE ACCEPTED AS COMMANDER OF THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH. JOINT PATROLS AND JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE OUT BECAUSE THESE WOULD BE SEEN AS A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, LEBANON IS PREPARED FOR THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION, AND GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT LEBANON STILL ACCEPTED THE NOTION OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

WHILE LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO ALLOW ITS NEGOTIATORS TO EXPLORE MUTUAL RELATIONS, GEMAYEL LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HE FELT HE HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS HE COULD SUBSTANTIVELY WITHOUT SACRIFICING ARAB RELATIONS. HE POINTEDLY REFERRED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT THAT THE US WOULD NOT ASK LEBANON TO DO ANYTHING THAT THREATENED ITS INTERNAL CONSENSUS OR ITS ARAB WOYLD RELATIONS.

NONETHELESS, THE LEBANESE WILL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE AWAITING THE NEW ISRAELI PROPOSALS AND THE RESULTS OF HABIB'S DELIBERATIONS IN THE US. (S/EXDIS)

LEBANON-LEBANESE FORCES: EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTS THAT WHILE

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THE LEBANESE FORCES (LF) MAINTAINS ITS PRESENCE AT THE KARANTINE HEADQUARTERS AND HAS TROOPS AT THE EASTERN ENTRANCES OF THE FIFTH BASIN. THE TURNOVER OF THE BASIN TO LEBANESE ARMY FORCES OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON MARCH 7. (C)

GENERAL TANNOUS TOLD BRIGADIER GENERAL COOLEY ON MARCH 6 OF A THREE PHASE PLAN FOR DEALING WITH THE LEBANESE FORCES. PHASE ONE WAS THE MOVE INTO EAST BEIRUT AND CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITY THERE WHICH HE SAID TERMINATED ON FEBRUARY 28. PHASE TWO WHICH BEGAN ON MARCH 7 CALLS FOR THE ARMY TO OPERATE IN THE ILLEGAL PORTS IN TYRE, SIDON, AND TRIPOLI, AND ESPECIALLY IN LF-CONTROLLED AREAS TO DRY UP SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE LEBANESE FORCES. PHASE THREE WILL BE THE ABSORPTION OF THE LF INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. TANNOUS HAS RECEIVED INDICATIONS FROM MANY LF OFFICERS OF ALL RANKS THAT THEIR FUTURE LIES WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY. TANNOUS SAID HE WILL NOT INCORPORATE THE LF AS A SEPARATE BRIGADE BUT WOULD KEEP SOME COMPANIES AS UNITS IF THEY ARE COMPETENT. (S/EXDIS)

EGYPT-PLO: EMBASSY CAIRO REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FURIOUS OVER THE PNC'S CALL ON EGYPT TO RENOUNCE THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, AS WELL AS BY THE COUNCIL'S BLATANT ATTEMPT TO PLAY UP TO THE OPPOSITION "NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND POPULAR FORCES" IN EGYPT. IN A FOUR-HOUR ADDRESS TO NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY DEPUTIES FROM LOWER EGYPT ON MARCH 5, MUBARAK WAS CAUSTIC IN HIS COMMENTS ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE PLO LEADERSHIP, REMINDED HIS LISTENERS THAT EGYPT'S SACRIFICES ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE FAR OUTSTRIPPED THOSE OF THE PLO, AND WARNED THAT ORGANIZATION HE WOULD RETALIATE FIERCELY AGAINST ANY EFFORT TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OR OTHERWISE TO MEDDLE IN EGYPT'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE REAFFIRMING THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, HE CALLED ONCE AGAIN ON THE PLO LEADERSHIP TO JOIN THE SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, NEGOTIATED MIDEAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE EMBASSY NOTES THAT SENIOR EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE PNC DECLARATION IN MEETINGS WITH PLOS OFFICERS WHO VISITED CAIRO FOLLOWING THE COUNCIL SESSION. (C)

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